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Tax Planning by Companies and
Tax Competition by Governments




Many claims have been made in recent years, both by the popular media
and by prominent economists, that we are living in a period of more ag-
gressive tax planning by multinational corporations (MNCs) and more
intense tax competition by governments (Tanzi 1996). The source of such
claims is globalization brought on by the relaxation of controls on trade
and capital and by the revolution in communications. This paper examines
the extent to which the evidence supports these claims. The emphasis is
on the period from 1984 to 1992, for which the available U.S. Department
of the Treasury ﬁrm-level ﬁles can be used, supplemented by published
data for the years after 1992. In addition to the ﬁrm-level data, changes in
average eﬀective tax rates in sixty countries are used to examine the re-
sponses of governments to the new global environment.
Various areas of MNC and government behavior are examined. One is
the eﬀective tax rates that MNCs pay to host governments. Have some
U.S. companies been able to obtain larger than average tax concessions
through tax planning? In addition to the question of the tax rate is that of
the tax base to which the eﬀective rate applies. Have U.S.-based MNCs
been able to shift larger amounts of income to low-tax locations? Is more
company debt put on the books of high-tax aﬃliates? Have U.S. subsidiar-
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113ies abroad paid out more royalties to their parents because their parents
expect to have excess credits that can shield the royalties from U.S. tax?
Turning to the behavior of governments, did the pattern of declines in
eﬀective tax rates suggest increased tax competition? Was there a signiﬁ-
cant convergence in eﬀective tax rates? Were there disproportionate de-
clines in more homogeneous regions, such as the European Economic
Community (EEC), where tax competition might be expected to be more
intense? Did governments grant greater concessions to new companies or
to internationally mobile industries, such as electronics and ﬁnance?
The possibility that MNCs have managed to lower their foreign tax rates
through tax planning or that governments have increased their concessions
to MNCs is suggested by Grubert, Randolph, and Rousslang (1996), who
found that the average foreign tax rate on the repatriated income of U.S.
parent companies declined from 36 percent in 1984 to 25 percent in 1992.
The decline was attributable primarily to a reduction in host-country ef-
fective tax rates. The increased importance of royalties at the expense of
dividends also played a role. The country-by-country changes in eﬀective
tax rates reported by U.S. companies are generally larger than one might
expect from published reports of tax reforms or available estimates of
changesinHall-Jorgensonmarginaleﬀectivetaxrates.Onequestion,there-
fore, is the extent to which company tax planning may have contributed
to this large fall in the burden of taxation abroad. Another question is
whether countries gave preferences to certain kinds of industries or com-
panies.
A way of evaluating any company role in falling eﬀective tax rates is to
attempt to identify those companies that might be expected to take advan-
tage of the changed international environment. There are at least two alter-
native hypotheses, however, for which companies might make the greatest
eﬀort to lower their foreign tax burdens. One is based on the incentive to
reduce excess foreign tax credits. For some companies, incentives for low-
ering foreign tax burdens were greatly increased by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (P.L. 99-514). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986) reduced
the U.S. corporate tax rate from 46 to 34 percent. Companies with overall
average foreign tax rates on net repatriated income higher than 34 percent
(not just those with rates higher than 46 percent) would now have excess
credits. Companies that, as a result, might now expect to be permanently
in excess credit would have a much greater incentive to reduce foreign tax
rates than would companies whose average foreign tax rates were already
lower than 34 percent in 1984. In addition, the companies with overall
foreign tax rates initially higher than 46 percent would attempt to take
advantage of new opportunities for reducing foreign taxes.
The alternative hypothesis is basically the mirror image of the ﬁrst one.
If a company had a low overall foreign tax rate in 1984, one explanation
is that its operations were mobile. It might be expected to have achieved
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1984 if countries began to compete for its locations more aggressively. For
example, the company might threaten to leave if it were not granted special
concessions. Another possibility is that the parent company had a low
overall foreign tax rate in 1984 because it was innovative in tax planning.
Globalization might give the parent new opportunities to use its experi-
ence to lower its tax rates even further. In either case, the company would
gain not in the form of lower taxes no longer useful as credits, but in the
form of lower foreign taxes on income it retained abroad.
Although it is convenient to distinguish between the behavior of govern-
ments and the behavior of companies, it is frequently impossible to identify
the source of a tax diﬀerential, which is presumably brought about in a
mutual process. If a government lowers its tax rate by the same amount to
all entrants, that lowering can fairly be regarded as a country response. If
a company shifts income because of a diﬀerence in statutory tax rates,
the shift can be referred to as a company response. Other cases are more
ambiguous, however. If companies with initially low average worldwide
tax rates succeed in achieving even larger reductions, they may have been
able to do so because of either their innovations in tax planning or their
being able to get even greater concessions from governments because they
are mobile.
The evidence provides some signs of changes in behavior by companies.
Parent companies with low overall foreign tax rates in 1984 did enjoy sig-
niﬁcantly greater declines in eﬀective tax rates in a given location than
did the average U.S. parent. Accordingly, the aggressive-or-mobile-parent
hypothesis dominates the excess-credit hypothesis, although anticipated
excess credits seem to have played a role in the switch from dividends to
royalties. Income shifting from high-tax to low-tax locations also seems to
have become more aggressive, judging by the diﬀerential in the pretax re-
turn on assets for a given diﬀerence in statutory tax rates. However, the
allocation of debt between high and low statutory tax countries was very
stable. In both 1984 and 1992, leverage is strongly inﬂuenced by local tax
rates but the equations are virtually identical in both years.
The evidence of increased tax competition at the country level is also
mixed. Eﬀective tax rates fell on average but there was a wide diversity
of behavior among countries. The concessions enjoyed by newly investing
companies compared to mature companies were about the same in 1992
as in 1984. The gap between the eﬀective tax rate on ﬁnance aﬃliates and
manufacturing subsidiaries widened only slightly, if at all. More mobile
manufacturing industries, such as electronics, did not enjoy greater tax
reductions. Tax rates did not fall more in homogeneous areas with low
trade barriers, such as the EEC. Furthermore, countries did not aggres-
sively attempt to attract tax bases, as opposed to real activities, by dispro-
portionately lowering statutory tax rates compared to eﬀective rates. In-
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though they were much higher to start with.
That said, there are signiﬁcant signs of heightened tax competition by
governments. The smaller, poorer, and more open countries lowered their
tax rates the most. They might be expected to be most aﬀected by the
increased mobility of capital. Also, the implications for foreign govern-
ments of the apparent increased tax sensitivity of real U.S. investment
found by Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (chap. 1 in this volume) suggest
that tax competition may explain the large fall in eﬀective tax rates that
took place. What if governments set tax rates on U.S. companies only in
order to maximize revenue? Using the Altshuler-Grubert-Newlon elas-
ticity (with respect to (1  t)) of 1.53 in 1984 and 2.77 in 1992, we ﬁnd
that the simple revenue-maximizing tax rate on inbound U.S. investment
in manufacturing decreased from 39.5 percent to 26.5 percent.1 This is
only slightly larger than the mean change in average eﬀective tax rates that
actually occurred, and the levels match pretty closely as well.
What are the implications of this mixed picture? Why is there not a more
consistent pattern of reactions to globalization? Perhaps “globalization”
has not been occurring as fast as supposed. Indeed, U.S. Department of
Commerce evidence indicates that interaﬃliate transactions have not in-
creased in relative importance since 1977. The gross product of U.S. manu-
facturing aﬃliates abroad grew at about the same rate as U.S. manufactur-
ing from 1982 to 1994. It may be that the new incentives for tax planning
created by TRA 1986 were not very signiﬁcant to start with because of the
opportunities for deferral that had always existed; or it may be that the
incentives were diluted by governments’ reducing eﬀective tax rates on
their own largely for domestic purposes.
Recent accounts of the growing importance of tax planning and tax
competition may also overlook the weapons that governments have at their
disposals to resist the erosion of their tax bases. Countries have become
more aware of potential transfer pricing abuses and have introduced new
regulations. Many home governments have either introduced new or
strengthened existing controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules that re-
duce the beneﬁts of using tax havens for passive and other income. Indeed,
the expanded current U.S. taxation of ﬁnancial CFCs mandated by TRA
1986 may be one reason ﬁnance aﬃliates did not obtain greater tax bene-
ﬁts from host governments.
Furthermore, governments may be able to do much more on their own.
Evidence at the end of this paper suggests that perhaps the U.S. CFC rules,
which are probably the most restrictive of those of the major industrialized
1. This is based on countries’ assuming that the pretax rate of return will remain the same
as the tax rate is lowered.
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come seems to escape current U.S. tax.
Turning to methodology, the results call into question the common use
of a parent company’s excess credit position as an exogenous variable in
studies of MNC behavior. Companies are not be born high-tax or low-
tax, nor are they assigned randomly to these categories. If a company has
managed to arrange a low-average eﬀective tax rate on its foreign opera-
tions, it might be that its behavior is systematically diﬀerent from that of
its U.S. counterparts.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the incentives
for tax planning by U.S. multinational companies and how these may have
changed as a result of TRA 1986. It also summarizes recent data on the
extent of globalization. Section 5.3 describes the data used in the empirical
analysis. Because a company’s expectations about its excess credit position
may be important in its tax-planning strategy, section 5.4 begins the empir-
ical analysis by evaluating alternative predictors of a company’s future
excess credit status. The results are used as building blocks in the subse-
quent sections. Section 5.5 presents the basic empirical results of the rela-
tionship between an MNC’s overall worldwide tax rate in 1984 and the
change in the tax burden on its operations in each country from 1984 to
1992. Each parent company’s operations in a given location in 1984 and
1992 are linked to see which type of company obtained the largest tax re-
ductions. Sections 5.6 and 5.7 use parallel regressions at the CFC level for
1984 and 1992. Section 5.6 examines CFC eﬀective tax rates to see if coun-
tries have given greater tax concessions to new, more mobile operations.
Section 5.7 compares income-shifting behavior in 1984 and 1992 to see if
reported CFC proﬁtability has become more sensitive to local tax rates. It
also determines whether more debt is being placed in high-tax CFCs, be-
cause this is one of the ways in which taxable income can be shifted in the
worldwide company. Section 5.8 examines the relationship between excess
credit expectations and the change in royalties received by the parent to
determine whether companies that expected to be in excess credit received
more royalties from their aﬃliates. Section 5.9 switches the focus from the
company level to the country level to determine which countries cut their
tax rates on U.S. companies the most. The object is to see if we can identify
patterns consistent with increased tax competition. Section 5.10 reviews
CFC rules that eliminate the beneﬁts of using tax havens.
5.2 The Changed Incentives for Lowering Foreign Taxes
5.2.1 The Eﬀect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
The TRA 1986 made several changes aﬀecting companies’ tax planning
incentives: (1) Most importantly, it lowered the statutory U.S. tax rate to
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rate on distributed income would have been between 46 and 34 percent
had an increased incentive to lower foreign taxes because, on the margin,
foreign taxes had no value as credits. (2) Companies were required to allo-
cate more U.S. expenses, particularly interest, to foreign source income for
the purpose of calculating the foreign tax-credit limitation. This would
tend to drive some companies into excess credit and increase the excess
credits of those already over the threshold. (3) The tightening-up of the
antiabuse rules in subpart F of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, providing
for the current taxation of “passive” and other tainted CFC income, re-
duced the beneﬁts of tax planning. The de minimis threshold for the
amount of tainted income that would trigger current U.S. tax was lowered
substantially. In addition, the “active banking” exception for passive in-
come was eliminated. Prior to TRA 1986, an “active” ﬁnancial operation
abroad was not subject to current U.S. tax on investment income such
as interest.
If a company starts to have excess credits because of the lowering of the
U.S. corporate rate, it obviously has an incentive to reduce its foreign taxes
as long as it does not increase U.S. taxable income. A lower foreign tax
burden can be achieved in various ways. The company may attempt to
negotiate or otherwise arrange lower eﬀective rates in its locations abroad.
It could increase the amount of income it has in low-tax locations, either
by shifting the location of real activity or by shifting the location of in-
come. Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon in this volume examine the change
in the tax sensitivity of real investment. This paper focuses on planning
that lowers eﬀective tax rates or shifts income.
It is necessary, however, to be more precise about the changed incentives
for income shifting. Because of the opportunities for deferring income in
low-tax locations, the change in incentives for some types of income shift-
ing may not have been great when TRA 1986 caused a company to move
from excess limit to excess credit. If the parent is in excess limit, income
can be shifted from a high-tax foreign country to a low-tax location where
repatriation to the United States can be deferred. The only oﬀset to the
tax savings in the high-tax country, compared to a company with excess
credits, would be the additional credits that distributions from a high-tax
country could generate to the extent that its eﬀective tax rate was above
the U.S. rate.2 If a company is pushed into excess credit by the reduction
in the U.S. tax rate, the value of low-tax income will increase only to the
extent of the present value of the U.S. taxes that would have been paid
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2. Even these might not all be currently used as credits against U.S. tax because CFCs do
not generally distribute all of the income. Furthermore, a country may have a high statutory
tax rate, which determines the value of shifting income on the margin, but a low average
eﬀective rate, which would result in a positive repatriation tax if income is repatriated. (See
Grubert 1998.)formerly, when the low-tax income was repatriated. (As I explain later on,
the company can get a further beneﬁt if it can bring the low-tax income
home as a royalty because it is deductible abroad and exempt in the United
States.)ThenetchangeresultingfromTRA1986maybesmallifmostofthe
low-tax income had been retained abroad and the tax rate in the high-tax
country was not far above the U.S. rate, creating few spillover tax credits.
Turning to the incentives for shifting income in or out of the United
States: When a parent company is in excess limit, shifting income from the
United States to a low-tax location where the income is deferred can be
very proﬁtable. On the other hand, shifting income from a high statutory
tax country to the United States in the excess limit case is useful only if all
of the foreign income would not have been distributed. If all high-tax in-
come is distributed, any savings in foreign tax are simply oﬀset by lower
foreign tax credits in the United States.
If the parent is in excess credit, the value of shifting income out of the
United States to a low-tax country increases only to the extent of the elimi-
nation of any residual tax on eventual dividends. The value of shifting
income out of a high-tax foreign country to the United States depends on
whether the higher payment by the foreign aﬃliate to its parent is foreign
or U.S. source. If it is U.S. source—for example, a payment for U.S. ser-
vices—the beneﬁt of shifting from a foreign country to the United States
is simply tF  tUS where tF is the foreign statutory tax rate and tUS is the
U.S. tax rate. Any subsequent repatriations of foreign income are irrelevant
because they neither trigger U.S. tax nor generate useful excess credits.
However, increased royalties, which are foreign source, could become
much more proﬁtable when the parent is in excess credit. When the parent
company did not have excess credits, the value of an extra royalty paid by
a foreign aﬃliate depended on the diﬀerence between the foreign statutory
tax rate, at which the royalty is deducted, and the domestic tax rate, at
which it is included in income. Furthermore, even that margin of beneﬁt
for paying royalties from a high-tax country would disappear if the income
was distributed as a dividend and produced excess credits. If the parent is
now in excess credit, the beneﬁts of an increased royalty payment is fully
the saving in foreign tax (less any withholding tax, which is typically
small), because the royalty, being foreign source, would be exempt from
U.S. tax. The U.S. tax rate on the royalty is lowered not to 34 percent but,
eﬀectively, to 0.
The beneﬁts of shifting debt from the United States abroad and from
high-tax to low-tax countries can be summarized brieﬂy. Reallocating debt
within the worldwide corporation is one way in which net income can be
shifted, but interest allocations to foreign income by the parent add a fur-
ther consideration. If the parent has to make interest allocations, it has the
added bonus of shifting debt abroad if it is in excess credit because parent
interest expense is not fully deductible against U.S. tax. (See Altshuler and
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debt abroad.
To summarize, for ﬁrms that move to an excess credit position due to
TRA 1986, the incentive to shift income from high- to low-tax jurisdic-
tions may not be greatly altered; the incentive to shift income into the
United States is greatly enhanced if the payment is foreign source (e.g., a
royalty); and the incentive to shift debt from the United States is increased.
5.2.2 Globalization
A company’s strategy for shifting income and using tax-saving strategies
is a function of (1) the diﬀering tax rates in the countries in which they
operate, (2) the opportunities for implementing tax-saving strategies pro-
vided by their operations, and, (3) the antiabuse and penalty provisions
that governments can use to thwart various tax-planning devices. The pre-
vious section outlined how TRA 1986 changed the beneﬁts of various tax-
minimizing strategies for a given set of international tax systems.
Commentators who stress globalization presumably emphasize the sec-
ond factor. Multinational operations around the world, it is said, are now
more closely linked, providing greater opportunities to reduce taxes. In
fact, the evidence does not point to the growing importance of intraﬁrm
trade. A recent report by the U.S. Department of Commerce, examining
transactions from 1977 through 1994, concludes that “The shares of in-
traﬁrm trade in U.S. exports and imports of goods have changed very
little” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997a). Also, intraﬁrm trade has
not increased as a percentage of foreign aﬃliates’ total trade. Another De-
partment of Commerce study found that the real gross product of U.S.
manufacturing aﬃliates grew from 1982 to 1994 at about the rate of host-
country industrial production over the period. In addition, the real prod-
uct of U.S. manufacturing aﬃliates abroad increased less than the gross
product of manufacturing industries in the United States (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce 1997b).
Moreover, discussions of tax competition often downplay the third fac-
tor, the fact that governments can respond to companies’ attempts to ex-
ploit diﬀerences in tax rates. Many have adopted CFC rules that subject
interest, dividends, and royalties received to current home-country tax.
(See OECD 1996.) For example, the United Kingdom’s CFC legislation
was enacted in 1984, partly in response to the abolition of exchange con-
trols in 1979. The New Zealand CFC regime became eﬀective in 1988 and
the Australian legislation became eﬀective in 1990. The U.S. subpart F
rules go farther than most in that they subject related-party sales routed
through a low-tax aﬃliate to current tax. However, some countries’ CFC
provisions even go so far as to eliminate tax deferral for all investment in
low-tax countries. Many governments have implemented a new round of
more stringent and explicit transfer pricing guidelines. In addition, some
governments have attempted to reduce the opportunities for portfolio in-
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similar to the passive foreign investment company (PFIC) legislation in
the United States. The Australian and New Zealand FIF (foreign invest-
ment fund) regimes are examples.
5.3 Data Sources
The principal data source is made up of the linked corporate tax ﬁles of
large (assets greater than $250 million in 1984 and $500 million in 1992)
U.S. MNCs in 1984 and 1992. The ﬁles comprise Form 1120, the basic
corporate tax return; Form 1118, on which foreign tax credits are claimed;
and Form 5471, giving information on the sales, income, and assets of
each CFC. Companies were included in the empirical work only if they
ﬁled corporate tax returns in each of the two years analyzed. (Firms might
disappear from the ﬁle because of mergers and acquisitions, among other
reasons.) In addition, each had to have ﬁled either Form 5471 or Form
1118 in each year. (An MNC might not ﬁle Form 1118 in a given year if it
had worldwide losses or could not claim a foreign tax credit for other rea-
sons.) Parents whose principal business was ﬁnance were excluded because
of their special nature and the particular tax rules (for insurance reserves,
for example) that apply to them. Information on company R&D was taken
from Standard & Poors Compustat Services.
The average eﬀective tax rates used in the empirical work, either for a
given CFC or for the country average, are based on the foreign taxes paid
and net income reported on Form 5471. The net income measure is earn-
ings and proﬁts (E&P), which is deﬁned in the Internal Revenue Code and
is an attempt to approximate “true” net equity income. It is not local host-
country taxable income, which can reﬂect various investment incentives.
Finally, country statutory tax rates were taken from the Price Waterhouse
guides for 1984 and 1992.
Hall-Jorgenson-King-Fullerton (HJKF) marginal eﬀective tax rates are
not available for the sixty-country sample used in the paper. Besides, the
average eﬀective tax rates used here have some advantages over HJKF
rates, which usually reﬂect only a few basic features of business taxation—
namely, the statutory tax rate, tax depreciation rates, and investment tax
credits. The HJKF rates also overlook many important features of the tax
system, such as the capitalization of expenses rules that were very impor-
tant in TRA 1986. The HJKF marginal tax rates also do not capture spe-
cial incentives oﬀered to companies in “not fully transparent” systems,
which may be important in the context of this paper.3
3. Chennels and Griﬃth (1997) have estimated HJKF rates for ten countries over the
period. The country-by-country changes they report do not seem consistent with the changes
we compute from the U.S. Department of the Treasury ﬁles.
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The discussion in the previous section of the relationship between excess
credit positions and the incentives to reduce both total foreign taxes paid
and foreign tax rates assumed that companies’ positions were completely
predictable. Yet a company’s excess credit in any one year, 1984 for ex-
ample, reﬂects its repatriation decisions in that year and may be subject to
various transitory inﬂuences. This section, therefore, attempts to deter-
mine which measure derived from a company’s 1984 reports is the best
predictor of the foreign tax rate on its repatriated income in the general
basket in 1992. This may help us identify the companies whose incentives
may have changed.
The dependent variable in table 5.1 is the foreign tax rate on repatriated
income in 1992 in the general or “active” basket, which seems a convenient
measure of the company’s 1992 credit status.4 (Simply using a variable in-
dicating whether the company is in excess credit yields similar results.) The
subsample is made up of those companies in the original sample that
claimed a foreign tax credit in both 1984 and 1992. The alternative pre-
dictors based on 1984 information were
1. The foreign tax rate on net distributed income in 1984.
2. The 1984 foreign tax rate on dividends only. This may be a better
indicator of permanent excess credit status because it is less sensitive to
yearly changes in the mix of foreign income.
Table 5.1 Predictors of 1992 Credit Position (dependent variable is foreign tax rate on net
repatriated income in 1992)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign tax rate on distributed income in 1984a .329 .304
(4.76) (3.01)
(Limitation  foreign taxes)/parent assets .009 .005
(4.64) (2.08)
Computed average tax rate on foreign operations .153 .133
in 1984b (.60) (.58)
Foreign tax rate on dividends in 1984 .069
(.78)
Adjusted R2 .125 .120 .01 .184
Note: N  152. Sample is large nonﬁnancial parents who claimed a foreign tax credit in both 1984 and
1992. Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
aForeign tax rate on net distributed income is the ratio of total foreign taxes paid on distributed income
to total net foreign distributed income. All calculations are for the “general” or “other” baskets only.
bThis is calculated from all the income and foreign taxes paid as reported by foreign corporations
controlled by the parent. It therefore includes the income (and associated taxes) that is not repatriated.
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4. The U.S. limitation on foreign tax credits is calculated for each type of “basket” of
foreign income. The intent is to isolate active income, which tends to bear relatively high
foreign taxes, from lightly taxed income, such as passive interest.3. The diﬀerence between the tentative U.S. tax on the foreign income
and total foreign tax paid, divided by total parent assets. This scaling is
used to express the signiﬁcance of any excess credit (or limit) level. If repa-
triations are small in any year, they may not be good indicators of future
excess credit status.
4. The synthetic average tax rate on foreign activity computed from the
location of each company’s foreign capital and host-country tax rates. It
is the potential average foreign tax rate on a company’s foreign operations,
regardless of whether the income is repatriated, and is computed from the
location of its real assets abroad as reported by its CFCs in 1984 and the
average eﬀective tax rate in each location. The country average tax rate is
used to ﬁlter out the noise in rates for speciﬁc companies in any year. Also,
the CFC’s own rate would not exist if it were making losses in that year.
Table 5.1 indicates that foreign tax credit status in 1984 and 1992 are
correlated, although the persistence may not be quantitatively very impres-
sive. The company’s foreign tax rate on net distributed income in 1984,
used in column (1), turns out to be the best predictor of the comparable
tax rate in 1992. Column (2) indicates that the absolute deﬁcit in credits
in relation to parent size performs almost as well, and it is still signiﬁcant
in the last column when all measures are included in the regression. Col-
umn (3) shows that the measure intended to reﬂect permanent excess
credit status unfortunately has little predictive power.5 The foreign tax, or
“gross up,” rate on dividends added in column (4) also does not contribute
much information. The straightforward overall foreign tax rate on repatri-
ated net income seems to be more useful because it reﬂects all the various
components of foreign income and is computed after all deductions to
foreign income, which may be signiﬁcant for some companies. (Even
though some 1984 indicators did not seem useful in predicting the 1992
position, they will nevertheless be used as possible predictors of changes
in behavior.)
5.5 Change in Country Tax Rates by Company
The question is: Why did some companies in a given location have larger
declines in eﬀective tax rates on net income than others? Is it because of
expected foreign tax credits that may have aﬀected their incentives for
using tax planning devices or attempting to negotiate lower rates? Were
some industries favored over others, as might be the case if countries are
competing to attract more mobile industries? Or was it simply that compa-
nies with unusually high eﬀective tax rates in 1984 had a tendency to re-
turn to the mean?
Accordingly, in this section, a parent U.S. company’s operations in a
5. One reason may be that there isn’t much variation in the measure across companies.
The standard deviation in the computed foreign tax rate is only about 5 percent.
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all CFCs owned by a given parent in a location are ﬁrst aggregated. Be-
cause the change in country tax rates is the focus, a company-country ob-
servation is used only if the company has CFCs in the country in both
years. In addition, it has to be possible to compute a tax rate in each year,
so E&P before tax must be positive in both years.
In table 5.2, each parent company-country combination for which data
are available is a separate observation. The dependent variable is a com-
pany’s eﬀective tax rate (ETR) in the country in 1984 minus its eﬀective
tax rate in 1992—that is, the reduction of the tax rate in percentage points.
A larger fall from 1984 to 1992 is, therefore, a larger positive number. The
independent variables are (1) the change in the average eﬀective tax rate in
thecountryforallU.S.manufacturingaﬃliates,(2)thediscrepancybetween
the company’s 1984 eﬀective tax rate and the country average in 1984, to
capture the possibility of a tendency to return to the country average, (3)
a dummy variable for parents in electronics and computers, and (4) various
measures of the company’s actual or potential excess credit status in 1984.
Electronics and computer companies are chosen because they seem to be
very responsive to local tax rates (see Grubert and Mutti 1997).
Table 5.2 indicates that a higher parent overall foreign tax rate in 1984
is associated with a smaller decline in the company’s tax rate in a country
compared to the average country decline, not a higher one as the increased
incentives for planning by companies in an excess credit position might
lead one to expect. In column (1), the third independent variable (the par-
ent’s overall foreign tax rate on repatriated income in 1984) tests the
hypotheses on which companies had the largest reductions in foreign tax
burdens. It has a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient, so that companies with
higher overall foreign taxes in 1984 obtained smaller declines in foreign
tax burdens. The ﬁrst independent variable (the average change in the ef-
fective tax rate on manufacturing in the country) shows that, not surpris-
ingly, it is an important determinant of the change in the company’s tax
rate. The second independent variable (the diﬀerence between a company’s
tax rate in the country in 1984 and the country average) indicates a strong
regression to the mean. Finally, the coeﬃcient for the electronics and com-
puters dummy is negative and smaller than its standard error, indicating
that the industries that appear to be mobile did not receive unusually large
reductions in their tax burdens.
The succeeding columns, which use alternative measures of the parent
company’s excess credit status in 1984, present a picture similar to that in
the ﬁrst column. Column (2) recognizes that companies with permanently
very high foreign tax rates in 1984 already had a strong incentive to reduce
the burdens of their foreign taxes because they were in excess credit even
at a U.S. rate of 46 percent. The foreign tax rate on repatriated income is
divided into three intervals, a rate higher than 0.46, a rate between 0.46
124 Harry Grubertand 0.34, and a rate lower than 0.34. There is not much evidence of a
nonlinear eﬀect, and higher overall foreign tax rates in 1984 are still associ-
ated with smaller declines in the country for the company. Both columns
(1) and (2) indicate that the average tax rate on repatriated income has a
quantitatively large eﬀect on country tax reductions. For example, the
0.128 coeﬃcient in column (1) means that a 1 standard deviation in-
crease in the 1984 tax rate on distributed income resulted in a 1.8 percent-
age point reduction in the local tax rate.
Column (3) uses the 1984 foreign tax rate on dividends as the measure
of excess credit positions. It also has a signiﬁcant negative, not positive,
coeﬃcient, which is consistent with the results in the ﬁrst two columns. In
column (4), the computed measure of the average foreign tax rate on for-
eign activity, based on the location of CFC assets and average tax rate in
the country, again has little explanatory power. Column (5) interacts the
Table 5.2 Which Companies Obtained the Largest Tax Reductions? Change in Company
Country Eﬀective Tax Rates
Dependent Variable: ETR 1984  ETR 1992
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in country average .824 .823 .826 .819 1.16
eﬀective tax rate in (16.71) (16.98) (16.70) (16.50) (10.31)
manufacturing
Company rate in 1984  .874 .875 .880 .869 .874
average country rate in 1984 (35.94) (35.88) (35.69) (35.56) (35.95)
Parent foreign tax rate on .128
distributed income in 1984a (3.63)
Electronics and computers .011 .088
(.85) (.60)
Rate on repatriated income .042
 .46 (3.52)
Rate on distributed income .020
.46–.34 (1.57)
Foreign tax rate on dividends .107
in 1984 (2.80)
Computed average tax rate on .051
foreign operations in 1984a (.59)
Tax rate on distributed .833
income *change in country (3.40)
average
Adjusted R2 .543 .542 .541 .538 .543
Note: N  1,154. ETR  eﬀective tax rate. All of an MNC’s CFCs in a country are aggregated. Obser-
vations are used only if company has CFCs in a given location in both years. Each company-country
combination is a separate observation. Country average eﬀective tax rates are computed from total
CFC earnings and foreign taxes paid in a location. Only CFCs with positive earnings are included in
country average. Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
aDeﬁnition same as in table 5.1.
Tax Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by Government 125tax rate on repatriated income in 1984 with the change in country average
tax rates on the grounds that planning might be most important when
country tax rates are falling. The coeﬃcient is negative again, indicating
that companies with high overall foreign tax rates in 1984 obtained smaller
reductions in eﬀective tax rates.
These results support the interpretation that parent companies are not
born high-tax or low-tax, nor are they randomly assigned to high- or low-
tax countries. A low parent average tax rate in 1984 presumably indicates
that the parent had mobile activities or was engaged in aggressive tax plan-
ning. These were the companies that enjoyed larger than average declines
in foreign tax rates in the countries in which they were located. Their larger
than average reduction in foreign tax rates may indicate their continued
aggressive tax planning; it may also indicate their ability to negotiate lower
tax rates because of the potential mobility of their operations. Companies
whose 1984 overall foreign tax rate would lead them to expect excess cred-
its as a result of TRA 1986 were not the ones who lowered their foreign
tax burdens the most.
5.6 Tax Rates at the CFC Level
This section examines CFC tax rates in 1984 and 1992 to see if country
behavior has changed. For example, have governments made greater con-
cessions to attract ﬁnance aﬃliates? The observations in this section and
the next are on individual CFCs, in contrast to those of the previous sec-
tion in which all of a parent’s CFCs in a given location were aggregated.
Some data of interest are CFC speciﬁc, such as business activity and date
of incorporation. Furthermore, CFCs in 1984 and 1992 are not linked.
Rather, we use parallel regressions for each year, although the sample is
restricted only to parents on the corporate tax ﬁles in both years. It is also
necessary that data on the parent’s foreign tax credit status in 1984 be
available. Finally, CFCs with less than $10 million in assets are excluded
because of the likely noise in small operations. Also, larger CFCs tend to
receive more careful editing when the data ﬁle is assembled.
Before proceeding to the parallel regressions for tax rates in 1984 and
1992 in this section, and to debt and income shifting in the next section, it
might be appropriate to consider what a change in behavior means. For
example, what if ﬁnance aﬃliates retain the same 5 percentage point tax
advantage over manufacturing aﬃliates? The average tax rate on manufac-
turing fell substantially, but is a ﬁnance aﬃliate’s increased relative advan-
tage important? Does it indicate that countries are competing more aggres-
sively for ﬁnance companies? Companies are presumably interested in the
after-tax rate of return in a given location. A reduction of 5 percentage
points will have the same absolute eﬀect on after-tax rates of return what-
ever the initial level of tax rates. This absolute change may be relevant if a
126 Harry Grubertlocation has to overcome a certain absolute cost disadvantage. Further-
more, if tax rates fall generally in all countries, a 5 percentage point advan-
tage for ﬁnance will result in a smaller percentage advantage in after-tax
ratesofreturnforﬁnancethanitdidwhentaxrateswerehigher.Inanycase,
the attractive power of a 5 percentage point discount has not increased.
However, when we come to income shifting in the next section, relative
comparisons may be in order. We will see that, consistent with earlier stud-
ies, income tends to be shifted to locations with low statutory tax rates.
Average rates of return abroad may, however, change over time, and in
that case it might be appropriate to assume that, with unchanged incen-
tives and opportunities, a given percentage point diﬀerence in statutory
tax rates would result in the same amount of relative income shifting in
the two years, because tax oﬃcials’ responses might be guided by relative
diﬀerences in return. If the probability of penalties depends on relative
diﬀerences in returns and the amount of the penalty is proportional to the
current return, a given diﬀerence in statutory tax rates would seem to re-
sult in a given amount of relative income shifting over time.
Table 5.3 reports on the parallel regressions for CFCs’ eﬀective foreign
tax rates in 1984 and 1992. The eﬀective tax rate is again deﬁned as the
ratio of foreign tax paid to E&P, the measure of net equity income. The
independent variables are the country average eﬀective tax rate in manu-
facturing, two age categories based on the CFCs’ dates of incorporation,
and a dummy variable for CFCs in ﬁnance. (Note that only nonﬁnancial
parents are in our sample, but they may have ﬁnance CFCs for various
reasons.)
The 1984 regression in the ﬁrst row of table 5.3 indicates that CFCs
incorporated relatively recently have signiﬁcantly lower tax rates than the
country average. Investment incentives such as accelerated depreciation
and tax holidays tend to beneﬁt recently incorporated companies. Finance
aﬃliates have a tax rate more than 6 percentage points lower, holding the
country eﬀective tax rate on manufacturing constant.
The second row shows that the regression for CFC tax rates in 1992 is
virtually identical to the 1984 regression. Recently incorporated compa-
nies get about the same beneﬁts as in 1984. The tax advantage obtained
by ﬁnance subsidiaries is about the same. The last row of table 5.3 includes
the parent’s foreign tax rate on repatriated income in 1984. The coeﬃcient
is consistent with the ﬁnding in the previous section that companies with
high overall foreign tax rates in 1984 did not obtain greater country reduc-
tions in tax rates by 1992.
Greater tax competition by governments is not apparent in this CFC-
level data. Newly incorporated companies did not receive greater tax con-
cessions in 1992 than they did in 1984. Operations that appear to be highly
mobile, such as ﬁnance, always have lower tax rates than the average, but
this diﬀerential does not seem to be much larger in 1992 than in 1984.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.5.7 Have Income Shifting and the Allocation of Debt
Become More Sensitive to Taxes?
Table 5.4 moves on to the analysis of income shifting from high-tax to
low-tax countries. The incentives, on the margin, to shift income into or
out of a jurisdiction depend on its statutory tax rate. However, there is an
issue as to what measure of income—pretax proﬁts or after-tax proﬁts—
is the best indicator of the extent of income shifting. Pretax proﬁts seem
to be the most reliable, robust measure because there may be market forces
that tend to equate pretax rates of return. For example, the Samuelson-
Lerner theorem on factor price equalization is in terms of pretax factor
returns. If there is a tendency for the equalization of pretax rates of return,
then a comparison of after-tax returns will automatically ﬁnd lower proﬁts
in high-tax countries without any income shifting.
Accordingly, table 5.4 uses the ratio of pretax proﬁts to total assets as
the proﬁtability measure. (We will note the results for after-tax returns
after the discussion of table 5.4.) Columns (1) and (3) have parallel regres-
sions for 1984 and 1992 pretax income with the relevant year’s statutory
tax rate, the age dummies, and the ﬁnance dummy as independent vari-
ables. The statutory tax rate coeﬃcient is negative in each case and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The 1992 coeﬃcient is almost twice the 1984 coeﬃcient
in absolute value and the mean return is lower in 1992, suggesting both a
relative and an absolute increase in income shifting for a given statutory
tax rate diﬀerential.
Columns (2) and (5), which add the eﬀective tax rate as well as the
statutory tax rate to the 1984 and 1992 regressions, indicate that the role
of the eﬀective tax rate (or the information it provides) also seems to have
changed. In 1984, a higher eﬀective tax rate increased pretax proﬁts, hold-
ing the statutory tax rate constant. This might be expected in that a higher
local eﬀective tax rate raises pretax proﬁts for all ﬁrms apart from any
impact of income shifting. In 1992, however, the eﬀective tax rate in col-
umn (5) has a negative coeﬃcient. Indeed, in column (6), when the eﬀec-
tive tax rate is used alone as the exclusive tax variable, its coeﬃcient is
very close to the statutory tax rate coeﬃcient in size and signiﬁcance. (In
contrast, the comparable eﬀective tax rate coeﬃcient for 1984, not shown
in the table, is small and statistically insigniﬁcant.)
This change in the role of the local eﬀective tax rate in income shifting
may be attributable to the changing behavior of countries and companies.
One possibility is that some host countries grant companies special statu-
tory tax rates, in the form of tax holidays and the like, that are not appar-
ent in published descriptions of their tax regimes. These kinds of conces-
sions, however, would be reﬂected in the eﬀective tax rate reported by
CFCs in that location. Another possibility is that companies lower their
applicable statutory tax rates on their own through tax planning. This






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.might be the case if they use hybrid companies (to be described in more
detail shortly), in which a CFC in a high-tax location owns a tax-haven
downstream operation that is a corporation from the high-tax host coun-
try’s point of view, but is a branch—and therefore consolidated with its
upstream owner—from the U.S. tax system’s point of view. The CFC and
its tax haven operation, to which the CFC can shift income untaxed by
the high-tax country would appear as a single CFC in our data.
Column (4) of table 5.4 interacts the country statutory tax rate with the
parent’s 1984 overall foreign tax rate. High-tax companies in 1984 would
have had the greatest incentive to shift income out of high-tax countries
because of the greater likelihood that they would be in excess credit. The
variable, however, has no explanatory power. The parent’s current 1992
excess credit status, not shown in the table, also has no explanatory power.
Regressions (not shown) in which the ratio of after-tax income to assets
is used as the proﬁtability measure show that, in these as well, the 1992
coeﬃcient for the statutory tax rate is much larger in absolute value than
the 1984 coeﬃcient: 0.187 versus 0.115. Here, however, the results are
somewhat more diﬃcult to interpret because average after-tax returns were
higher in 1992 than in 1984, and some increase in the amount of income
shifting for a given statutory tax rate diﬀerential might have been expected.
Turning to the allocation of debt in the MNC, table 5.5 has parallel
regressions for CFC debt in 1984 and 1992. The principal incentive to
allocate enterprise debt is indicated again by the country statutory tax rate.
(Some shifting of debt may contribute to the income shifting in table 5.4
because proﬁtability is expressed in relation to total assets, not to equity.)
As expected, CFCs in high statutory tax countries have much more debt
in both 1984 and 1992. The mean level of debt abroad is higher in 1992,
which might be expected from the incentives to shift debt abroad created
by the interest allocation rules, but the coeﬃcient for the statutory tax rate
in 1992 is virtually the same as in 1984. As before, the parents’ 1984 credit
status in the third row has no explanatory power for 1992 debt.6
The analysis of pretax rates of return in this section seems to indicate
that companies engaged in greater income shifting from high-tax to low-
tax countries in 1992 than they did in 1984. Globalization may have in-
creased the opportunities for, and lowered the costs of, shifting income to
low-tax locations. It is diﬃcult to detect any evidence that expected excess
credits played a role.7
6. The 1992 coeﬃcient for the statutory tax rate is very close to the coeﬃcient reported by
Altshuler and Grubert (1997) in an equation with other tax variables, such as the withholding
tax rate on interest.
7. If, as Grubert, Randolph, and Rousslang (1996) report, companies’ excess credit posi-
tions have in general returned to their 1984 level, their marginal incentive for income shifting
would remain the same; but if income shifting had contributed to this elimination of prospec-
tive excess credits, one should nevertheless see proportionately greater income in low-tax
countries compared to the distribution of income in 1984.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.5.8 The Shift to Royalties and Excess Credit Positions
Grubert, Randolph, and Rousslang (1996) noted that one contributor
to the reduction in the foreign tax rate on distributed income in 1992 was
the shift from dividends to royalties. The previous discussion showed the
potentially large beneﬁts from switching to royalties if the parent is in an
excess credit position; this section indicates that the shift to royalties is one
area in which expectations of excess credits seem to have been signiﬁcant.
Table 5.6 presents regressions for the changing importance of royalties
to the parent company from 1984 to 1992. In each year, royalties received
by the parent, which tend to be mainly foreign, are ﬁrst scaled by dividing
by the parent’s sales. The dependent variable is the change in this ratio of
royalties to sales from 1984 to 1992.
In the ﬁrst regression, the independent variables are the parent’s R&D
as a percentage of sales in 1984 and the indicator of its future credit posi-
tion, its foreign tax rate on repatriated income in 1984. Research and de-
velopment has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect but the coeﬃcient for the
1984 foreign tax rate is not signiﬁcant. In the second regression, when
the 1984 foreign tax rate is interacted with R&D, the interaction term is
signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient of the R&D term by itself virtually disap-
pears. The equation also has more explanatory power. Companies that
performed more R&D had a greater opportunity to increase royalties, and,
of these, the ones that would have expected to have greater excess credits
took advantage of the opportunity.
5.9 Changes in Tax Rates by Country:
Who Cut Their Tax Rates the Most?
This section moves from the ﬁrm-level data and reviews the changes in
eﬀective and statutory tax rates in sixty countries from 1984 to 1992. As
Table 5.6 Did Expectations about Excess Credits Aﬀect Royalty Payments?
The Change in the Ratio of Royalties to Sales from 1984 to 1992
(parent level)
(1) (2)
R&D/sales in 1984 .1152 .0002
(4.03) (.01)
Foreign tax rate on repatriated income .0042
in 1984 (.78)
Foreign tax rate *R&D .316
(2.12)
Adjusted R2 .054 .069
Mean of dependent variable .0054 .0054
Note: N  256. Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
Tax Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by Government 133described earlier, the eﬀective tax rates are based on information returns
ﬁled by U.S. CFCs. The eﬀective rates apply to manufacturing CFCs only,
and where there is a speciﬁc statutory tax rate for manufacturing, it is the
o n et h a ti su s e d .
Table 5.7 gives the mean eﬀective and statutory tax rates in the sixty-
country sample in 1984 and 1992. Consistent with Grubert, Randolph,
and Rousslang (1996), the table shows that the mean average eﬀective tax
rate fell by almost 10 percentage points between 1984 and 1992. However,
there was no notable convergence in tax rates; the standard deviation in
eﬀective rates fell only modestly and increased in relation to the mean. (In
fact, the standard deviation of the eﬀective tax rates in 1980, not shown
on the table, was virtually the same as in 1992 even though the mean was
more than 8 percentage points higher.) The last row of the table indicates
that there was a wide diversity in tax changes from 1984 to 1992. Table
5.7 also shows that statutory tax rates fell substantially, but by less than
eﬀective rates did. There was also no convergence of statutory rates. The
diversity in behavior among countries may indicate that the system has
not yet settled down to a new equilibrium. The regressions in the next table
do indicate that, not surprisingly, high-tax countries tended to cut their
tax rates the most. Still, a greater convergence of tax rates would be a more
convincing sign of increased tax competition.
Table 5.8 presents simple regressions for the changes in eﬀective and
statutory tax rates. (The variables are the 1984 rate minus the 1992 rate,
so a reduction is positive.) In the ﬁrst regression, the dependent variables
are the eﬀective tax rate in 1984 and the regional dummies. As already
noted, the high-tax countries in 1984 lowered their eﬀective tax rates the
most8—but these tax reductions may have been for purely domestic rea-
sons. Does the pattern suggest tax competition? The regional dummies
show that, if anything, taxes fell less in the EEC than the average even
though one might expect that the integration of the European economies
Table 5.7 Tax Rates in 1984 and 1994: Manufacturing (sixty countries)
Average Eﬀective Rate Statutory Tax Rate
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
1984 .329 .141 .412 .146
1992 .230 .114 .334 .121
1984 minus 1992 .100 .113 .077 .083
Note: Eﬀective tax rates are total foreign tax paid divided by total pretax E&P in a location.
Only CFCs with positive earnings are included in totals.
134 Harry Grubert
8. There was no disproportionate reduction at the high end. When a squared 1984 eﬀective







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.would encourage tax competition. (Regional eﬀects are also weak in the
statutory tax rate regression in column [5].)
The second regression, however, indicates that eﬀective tax rates fell
much more in small, open, poor economies (see Grubert and Mutti 1997
for the measure of openness).9 The small countries may be the ones that
feel that greatest impact of more mobile capital ﬂows. Countries with open
regimes are the ones that would be engaged in tax competition. Invest-
ments in low-income countries with relatively cheap, unskilled labor may
be the kind that is most sensitive to cost diﬀerentials. Low-income coun-
tries may also be most susceptible to tax planning or demands for conces-
sions by MNCs. This second regression reveals a pattern that strongly
suggests an international motivation for corporate tax reductions.
The third regression examines the correlation between changes in statu-
tory tax rates and eﬀective tax rates. If changes in eﬀective tax rates on
U.S. companies are completely explained by changes in local statutory tax
rates, no room would be left for special concessions to MNCs or MNC
tax planning. Column (3) in table 5.8 indicates that the change in eﬀective
tax rates is correlated with the change in local statutory tax rates, but the
correlation is not very high. However, the addition of the 1984 discrepancy
between the statutory tax rate and the eﬀective tax rate in column (4)
greatly increases the explanatory power of the change in statutory tax
rates. One reason for adding the statutory versus eﬀective rate discrepancy
is that it may capture noise in the 1984 eﬀective tax rate. A temporarily
low eﬀective tax rate in 1984 would be associated with a smaller fall in
observed eﬀective tax rates from 1984 to 1992 for any change in statutory
rates. Another interpretation is that a large discrepancy between statutory
and eﬀective tax rates creates the conditions for “base broadening,” in
which statutory tax rates are lowered but average eﬀective rates are not.
In any case, the coeﬃcient close to 1 for the change in statutory tax rates
in column (4) suggests that governments were an important source of the
observed reduction in eﬀective tax rates. Nevertheless, the large positive
constant term leaves open the possibility of a substantial contribution by
company planning or special concessions to MNCs.10
The base-broadening interpretation for the statutory-eﬀective rate
diﬀerence receives some support in the regression for the change in statu-
tory tax rates in the last column. The 1984 discrepancy between statutory
and eﬀective tax rates has a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient. For any given
initial statutory tax rate, a country with an eﬀective tax rate that is much
9. Grubert and Mutti (1997) use four categories of international restrictions, or the ab-
sence thereof, based on World Bank listings. The two categories with the lowest restrictions
are in the open category in table 5.8.
10. This possibility is consistent with a change in statutory tax regression (not shown) in
which two of the variables that were signiﬁcant in explaining changes in eﬀective tax rates in
column (2), for open and poor countries, are not signiﬁcant for statutory rates.
136 Harry Grubertlower than its statutory tax rate decreased its statutory rate by a greater
amount so that it could be more in line with its eﬀective rate.
As noted in the introduction, the increased tax sensitivity of investment
found by Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (chap. 1, this volume) seems
generally consistent with the large mean decline in eﬀective tax rates under
the assumption that host governments simply maximize revenue from in-
bound U.S. investment. This is presented only as an illustrative exercise,
and it raises the question as to why all governments do not converge on
the mean. Presumably diﬀerent governments weigh considerations other
than revenue from U.S. companies diﬀerently. Some, for example, may put
greater emphasis on the external beneﬁts of inbound investment, whereas
others may be concerned about revenue losses from their domestic corpo-
rate sector.
Some of the results in this section do suggest increased tax competition.
The large drop in average tax rates is consistent with the increased mobility
of capital. The small, open, low-income economies that might be expected
to gain the most from lower tax rates did cut their taxes the most. Still,
there was no convergence of tax rates and other signs of tax competition
that might have been expected did not materialize. For example, eﬀective
tax rates in the EEC did not fall more than the average even though tax
competition might be expected to be intense in this group of homogeneous
integrated economies.
5.10 Tax Haven Income and the Antiabuse Rules
Countries can defend themselves against some attempts to move their
tax bases oﬀshore. In particular, the subpart F rules in the Internal Reve-
nue Code subject interest, dividends, royalties, and other investment in-
come received by controlled foreign corporations in the United States to
current U.S. tax. In addition to eliminating deferral for passive income, the
subpart F rules also tax income from the sales routed through a CFC for
ultimateconsumptioninathirdcountry.ThecurrentU.S.taxonpassiveand
foreign base sales income acts as a backstop to the transfer pricing rules.
These antiabuse rules would appear to eliminate the beneﬁts of using a
low-tax country unless the source of the income is from manufacturing
located there or from goods and services provided to the local population.
But how eﬀective are the antiabuse rules? As a test, we can see how much
CFC income in low-tax countries with very tiny populations and virtually
no manufacturing is actually subject to current U.S. tax. Take some low-
tax countries in the Caribbean as an example. Controlled foreign corpora-
tions incorporated in the three most popular locations in the Caribbean
report that currently-taxed subpart F income in 1992 was less than 50
percent of their total after-tax E&P in 1992. Apparently, the subpart F
rules are not fully eﬀective in achieving their objectives.
Tax Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by Government 137The evidence suggests that U.S. companies are using “hybrids” in these
locations—that is, the low-tax CFC has an entity in another, high-tax,
country that is a branch according to U.S. law but an incorporated subsid-
iary under the high-tax country’s law. The high-tax entity can, therefore,
pay royalties and interest to the low-tax CFCs that are deductible in the
high-tax country but are not subject to current U.S. tax. The CFC and its
branch are regarded as one consolidated corporation from the U.S. point
of view. That these branches are being used is suggested by the fact that
the Caribbean CFCs report paying tax equal to 11 percent of pretax in-
come, which is much more than they could conceivably be paying to the
countries in which they are incorporated.
5.11 Summary and Conclusions
There are some signs that governments and companies have responded
to the integrating world. Small, open, and low-income countries have cut
their eﬀective tax rates on corporations the most. They might be expected
to be the ones that are most aﬀected by increased capital mobility. Compa-
nies with a low overall foreign tax rate on repatriated income in 1984 were
able to achieve larger than average tax cuts in the countries in which they
were operating. This may reﬂect their increased bargaining power because
they are more mobile or because they have increased opportunities to ex-
ploit their skills at tax planning. More income is being shifted to low-
tax locations.
Much of the evidence, however, points to stability. The sensitivity of the
location of company debt in response to local statutory tax rates has not
changed. Governments have not given greater inducements to new inves-
tors, nor to mobile businesses such as ﬁnance. Tax rates did not fall by a
greater amount in homogeneous free-trade areas, such as the EEC, and
there was little convergence of eﬀective or statutory tax rates.
If there is a new international environment, both governments and tax
payers can respond. Governments can respond by lowering their tax rates,
but they can also respond by making resident companies less susceptible
to the attraction of low tax rates. More stringent CFC rules and more
comprehensive transfer pricing guidelines are two examples. If the oppor-
tunities and incentives for tax-minimizing strategies have increased, these
may have been largely oﬀset by changes in government policies.
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Comment Joel Slemrod
In this paper Harry Grubert assembles a wide range of evidence that sheds
light on the important changes in U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI)
since 1984. This evidence speaks to one of the most important public ﬁ-
nance issues of the twenty-ﬁrst century—the impact of globalization on
the ability of countries to eﬀectively tax the income of corporations and
capital income more generally. A strength of the paper—that it is wide
ranging—is also the source of its weakness—that it is a bit unfocused. A
more descriptive title should really be something like: “Some Facts That
May or May Not be Related to How the Tax Environment of U.S. Multi-
national Companies Changed Between 1984 and 1992.” In the absence of
a set of testable hypotheses derived from a structural model, or any model,
the language of the paper is necessarily very guarded. There are many,
many phrases such as “probably suggests,” “may reﬂect,” “may have been
largely oﬀset,” and so on. In spite of this limitation, the paper oﬀers a
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Tax Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by Government 139feast of fascinating trends and relationships that are worth chewing on and
trying to digest. No one working in this ﬁeld could fail to be stimulated
by it.
A recurring methodological issue is that, over the period under consid-
eration, two things happened: a general globalization of economic aﬀairs,
and the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986). Do the
changes we observe between 1984 and 1992 reﬂect the ﬁrst, or the second,
or a little of both? Would international business experts ignore TRA 1986,
and interpret all changes as evidence of globalization? We know that most
tax folks look at what happened over this period and presume that it’s all
due to TRA 1986. This question is reminiscent of the debate over the so-
called diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach used to examine the respon-
siveness of high-income individuals to the tax cut in TRA 1986, and the
tax increase of 1993. Is it really acceptable to ignore nontax changes oc-
curring over this period? How can we reliably disentangle the two? How
can we hope to do it without a model?
One of the important contributions of this paper is its marshaling of
provocative facts. Here’s one: The average foreign tax rate of U.S. multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) fell from 36 percent in 1984 to 25 percent in
1992, a truly startling decline. Was this due to increased tax competition
among governments, or increased tax planning by the corporations (maybe
due to TRA 1986), or a little of both?
Table 5.8 in the paper suggests that the decline in countries’ statutory
rates could explain as much as four-ﬁfths of the story; but it only suggests
that. One problem is that the tax averages are, as far as I can tell, simple
averages of all sixty host countries. Surely it would be informative to look
at a weighted average. In fact, why not do the following? Start with the
1984 data on the pattern of U.S. MNC investments abroad. Then presume
that, for each host country, the percentage reduction in average rates is
equal to that of the statutory rate. Assume no behavioral change. How
close does that get you to the pattern of company-by-company average tax
rates (ATRs) observed in 1992? Alternatively, one could assign the
country-wide average changes in ATR to each ﬁrm, assume no behavioral
response, and examine what kinds of ﬁrms diﬀer from that pattern. What
I’m seeking is a better way to distinguish the “countries changed, ﬁrms
were passive” story from “U.S. tax law changed, companies reacted” story.
Table 5.8 also reveals that the standard deviation of both the average
tax rates and the statutory rates fell. (Wouldn’t some kind of weighting be
appropriate here, too?) Grubert concludes that the drop is not particularly
large, and does not suggest intense competition for tax bases. To evaluate
this claim, it would be very helpful to bring in some theoretical structure.
A good start would be Roger Gordon and Jeﬀrey MacKie-Mason’s (1995)
theory that open economies would like to have no distorting source-based
taxes, but to pay a cost in domestic income shifting if their corporate rate
140 Harry Grubertdiverges too much from the rate on labor income. This raises the question
of whether corporate statutory rates have moved in tandem with individ-
ual rates.
Table 5.9 goes beyond country averages to simple regressions explaining
changes in tax rates. The regressions provide strong evidence of “regres-
sion toward the mean.” For example, other things being equal, if a country
had a tax rate of 0.5 in 1984, it would be 0.44 in 1992; if it was 0.2 in 1984,
it would be 0.28 by 1992. This seems to me to be evidence of competition.
However, the fact that there were lower reductions in the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), for given 1984 tax rates, makes Grubert skepti-
cal of the tax competition explanation, given that the pace of economic
integration in Europe probably exceeded the pace elsewhere. In the ab-
sence of a model, however, it’s not obvious why one should focus on this
piece of evidence or another. Another bit of suggestive evidence is that
governments lowered their statutory rates when they were far out of line
with their eﬀective rates. These facts are stimulating but, to my taste, less
valuable than if they followed a careful discussion of exactly what would
and what would not be evidence of tax competition, precisely deﬁned.
The most fascinating aspect of this paper is the investigation of which
MNCs’ average tax rates fell from 1984 to 1992. Grubert lays out two (not
necessarily mutually exclusive) hypotheses: (1) that TRA 1986 put more
companies into an excess foreign tax credit position, forcing them to take
more notice of host-country taxes and to ﬂee high-rate countries, and
(2) that more mobile (and therefore low-tax) companies took more advan-
tage of opportunities, so that already low-rate tax companies found ways
to do even more eﬀective tax planning. Table 5.2 shows that, company by
company, the tax rates of those companies with low ATRs in 1984 went
down more than the tax rates of companies with high ATRs in 1984. This
reﬂects badly on the ﬁrst explanation, but it is not clear that it is consistent
with the second: Why hadn’t the “mobile” companies already taken full
advantage of this mobility by 1984? One way to learn more about this
question would be to hold constant the 1984 country tax rates in 1992,
and look at the actual shift in company behavior—where the company is
located, where income is earned. How close does that get us to the actual
1992 pattern of taxes paid?
I don’t have the space to comment on all the evidence this paper un-
earths, and all the analyses it provides. There are a series of fascinating
questions posed, and a broad range of evidence presented. One pervasive
puzzle remains, though. Why, if the tax elasticity of FDI is 3, as work by
Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon in this volume and by Hines and Rice
(1994) suggests, are corporate tax collections as high as they are? To an-
swer that question, one needs to model both the country and ﬁrm optimi-
zation problems. As I suggested previously, for the country problem, one
must consider the interaction between the domestic and foreign tax situa-
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locate real operations and the income-shifting opportunities that the real
operations oﬀer.
In the absence of structural models of these decisions, empirical anal-
ysis inevitably will be unable to answer certain critical questions, such as
(1) If a country wants to increase inward FDI, should it do so by lowering
its statutory rate, or by oﬀering investment tax credits? (I strongly suspect
that, for a given average tax rate, or even marginal eﬀective tax rate, these
two policies will not have the same eﬀect.) And (2) What will be the eﬀect
on revenue of alternative tax changes?
I don’t mean to imply that constructing a structural model of ﬁrm and
country decisions that considers both the real investment and income-
shifting margins is an easy task. It will certainly be hampered by imperfect
data and tenuous identiﬁcation conditions. I do, nevertheless, believe it is
the appropriate path for future research. Grubert and I have made a small
step in this direction (Grubert and Slemrod 1998) by modeling how the
tax system aﬀects U.S. corporations’ investment and income shifting to
Puerto Rico. Creating a multicountry model will be a much more diﬃ-
cult task.
Estimating such a structural model is an ambitious agenda, to be sure,
but is one for which Harry Grubert and his collaborators has paved the
way with their painstaking and thoughtful analyses of the inﬂuence of
taxes on MNC behavior. I expect that he and they will be in the forefront
of the next wave of research that continues to sort out how taxes inﬂuence
our world of apparently ever-increasing economic integration.
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